The intense debate over counter-insurgency (COIN) in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan revolved around three related questions. First, should COIN forces focus on attacking insurgents or protecting the civilian population? Second, was victory defined by destroying the enemy or by building a legitimate and self-sustaining government? Third, would heavy investment in COIN doctrine and training erode the Army's conventional capabilities? These questions played out in fractious public debates pitting so-called 'COINdinistas', who emphasised the importance of population security and government legitimacy, against traditionalists who argued that the main role of the armed forces was to destroy armed enemies.
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The COINdinistas seemed to have the upper hand in the second half of the last decade. The Army and Marine Corps unveiled a new field manual on counter-insurgency to great fanfare; very few such documents are published by major university presses and with glowing blurbs.
1 The manual emphasised the paradoxical nature of insurgency and counter-insurgency, noting that what may look like successful military operations against the enemy might actually backfire if they alienate the population and undermine the legitimacy of the government. The chief architect of the manual was General David Petraeus, who had gained fame in Iraq by implementing these ideas in Mosul, one of the few bright spots in an otherwise dismal war.
2 As head of the Combined Arms Center, Petraeus convened a large group of scholars and practitioners to rewrite the field manual. Many of these same people went on to praise the General and promote his ideas. Most importantly, Petraeus returned to Iraq in 2007, when the war had descended into an atrocious spiral of ethno-sectarian violence and the government in Baghdad seemed incapable or unwilling to do anything about it. Armed with the new field manual and five additional 'surge' brigades, Petraeus seemed to pull off a miracle. While many commentators and some intelligence analysts had already declared the war a loss, violence actually plummeted in 2008 and the government achieved some semblance of control.
To be sure, there were early critics of FM 3-24, but they were overwhelmed by the chorus of approval when the doctrine was originally published, and most observers saw it as a major intellectual leap for a previously hidebound Army. It also helped successive presidents salvage a soft landing in Iraq out of what previously looked like a strategic debacle.
3
Impressed by his efforts, the Obama administration sent Petraeus to Afghanistan in 2009 with the hopes that he could pull off another miracle. As in Iraq, US officials claimed that they were committed to implementing a population-security counter-insurgency campaign, while simultaneously tackling the problem of local corruption and improving governance so that the fledgling regime in Kabul might become more legitimate. The administration authorised another surge of troops to help achieve these goals. The resilience of the Taliban, however, led to increased scrutiny of American strategy. Critics questioned whether the lofty goals like government legitimacy were practical or even necessary in terms of US interests. 4 Was it really necessary to prepare for an open-ended state-building project in an area with little strategic value? Was it really possible to build a strong and stable government in Afghanistan, a country with a history of weak central control and a tradition of parallel tribal institutions that diluted the power of the state?
5
Or was all this a fantasy? If the second surge was based on a myth about the first one, then US strategy was bound to fail. Not surprisingly, disillusionment with the results in Afghanistan led to serious revisionist accounts of Petraeus' first surge. Critics have argued that the reduction in violence in Iraq was due to many factors, not simply the introduction of a new US doctrine, and some of these factors were outside of US control. 6 The stabilisation that began to take hold in the second half of 2007 also coincided with the end of a grisly period of ethnic cleansing, in which nearly 5 million Iraqis were displaced. 7 The number of sectarian killings was bound to decrease as more previously heterogeneous neighbourhoods were cleansed. Moreover, genuine US successes had little to do with the COIN principles in FM 3-24. The Sunni Awakening in Anbar Province began because local leaders, who previously organised insurgent attacks against the United States, now felt threatened by al-Qaeda in Iraq and made common cause with US forces. American officers seized on this opportunity, which enabled very efficient counter-network operations by combining fine-grained local knowledge with US firepower. Critically, this did not require any new doctrine or any surge of new combat brigades.
8 US leaders also supported Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's decision to attack Shi'a militia in greater Basra. Maliki subsequently consolidated his own rule by excluding Sunni rivals from key government posts and by repressing anti-government dissent, sometimes quite brutally.
9 By choosing sides in intra-sectarian wars and by conducting very aggressive operations against terrorist networks, the United States was able to help forge a rough balance of power in Iraq. None of this
